Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts*
Forthcoming in the Cambridge Studies in Law and Society Series, Cambridge University Press

Autocrats routinely weaponize courts to sideline political rivals, turning political purges into judicial ones. But why do autocrats bother using courts to repress when the outcomes are presumed known from the start? In Undue Process, I argue that courts help institutionalize punishment where power is contested. By invoking the proceedings of court, autocrats show the consequences of defying authority through judicial spectacle, displays which can enforce obedience and dissuade dissent. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa since independence, I draw on fine-grained data and rich archival sources to analyze how, when, and why autocrats used courts to repress adversaries and stabilize autocratic rule. Undue Process provides new theoretical insights into the disciplinary dimensions of autocracy and speaks to scholars of political science, legal studies, autocratic and democracy, and African politics.

*Based on my dissertation Autocratic Courts in Africa, which received an honorable mention for the Lynne Rienner Best Dissertation Award (2019) from the African Politics Conference Group