PUBLICATIONS
Choi, D., Harris, J. A., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2022. "Ethnic Bias in Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Criminal Appeals in Kenya." 1-14. American Political Science Review.
Shen-Bayh, F. 2018. "Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival." World Politics, 70(3), 321-357.
Gloppen, S., Wang, V., Kanyongolo, E. and Shen-Bayh, F. 2022. “Malawi: Democratic Fits and Starts” In Democratic Backsliding in Africa? Autocratization, Resilience, and Contention, eds. L. Arriola, L. Rakner, and N. van de Walle, Oxford University Press
Choi, D., Harris, J. A., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2022. "Ethnic Bias in Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Criminal Appeals in Kenya." 1-14. American Political Science Review.
- Fiona McGillivray Best Paper Award (2020), the Political Economy section of the American Political Science Association (APSA)
- Featured in Unpacking Judicial Bias in Africa. Democracy in Africa Blog
- Featured in Does ethnicity influence judicial decisions in Kenya? London School of Economics Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa
Shen-Bayh, F. 2018. "Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival." World Politics, 70(3), 321-357.
- Best Article Award (2019) from Democracy and Autocracy, an organized section of APSA
Gloppen, S., Wang, V., Kanyongolo, E. and Shen-Bayh, F. 2022. “Malawi: Democratic Fits and Starts” In Democratic Backsliding in Africa? Autocratization, Resilience, and Contention, eds. L. Arriola, L. Rakner, and N. van de Walle, Oxford University Press
UNDER REVIEW
Measuring Judicial Politicization in African News Media (with Risa Kitagawa)
Justice for Whom? Judicial Populism as Window Dressing in Autocratic Regimes
Populists often frame the judiciary as emblematic of the corrupt, illegitimate elite, particularly when judgements go against popular notions of right and wrong. But populist judicial reforms need not bestow power to the people and may instead further entrench the position of elites. How can elites ``popularize'' the courts without truly conceding control? I argue that populist judicial reforms can serve as window dressing for state manipulations of the legal process, concealing top-down interventions in the law as reflections of popular morality. I examine these dynamics in postcolonial Malawi where populism and anti-imperialism were deeply intertwined, resulting in the promotion of supposedly indigenous norms of customary criminal justice pitted against colonial law and courts. I find that in this context, so-called Traditional Courts were ostensibly a gesture of empowerment for the people, but in reality enabled the president to centralize control over criminal punishment and also distracted the public from other pressing problems of law and order. My findings deepen understanding of judicial populism and provide insight into how manipulations of the criminal justice system can strengthen autocratic power.
Measuring Judicial Politicization in African News Media (with Risa Kitagawa)
- Conditionally accepted at The Journal of Politics
Justice for Whom? Judicial Populism as Window Dressing in Autocratic Regimes
Populists often frame the judiciary as emblematic of the corrupt, illegitimate elite, particularly when judgements go against popular notions of right and wrong. But populist judicial reforms need not bestow power to the people and may instead further entrench the position of elites. How can elites ``popularize'' the courts without truly conceding control? I argue that populist judicial reforms can serve as window dressing for state manipulations of the legal process, concealing top-down interventions in the law as reflections of popular morality. I examine these dynamics in postcolonial Malawi where populism and anti-imperialism were deeply intertwined, resulting in the promotion of supposedly indigenous norms of customary criminal justice pitted against colonial law and courts. I find that in this context, so-called Traditional Courts were ostensibly a gesture of empowerment for the people, but in reality enabled the president to centralize control over criminal punishment and also distracted the public from other pressing problems of law and order. My findings deepen understanding of judicial populism and provide insight into how manipulations of the criminal justice system can strengthen autocratic power.
SELECTED WORKS IN PROGRESS
Idioms of Empire: Political Narratives of Colonialism in the French Parliament, 1881-2005 (with Risa Kitagawa)
While a growing scholarship examines the legacies of colonialism, few studies address how members of colonial powers themselves discussed and debated the issues of empire. We examine how elites have framed colonial issues in political discourse over time, both during and after the formal colonial period. Focusing on France, we leverage a word embeddings approach on an original French-language corpus of parliamentary debates since 1881 and describe the degree to which moral, economic, and martial narratives have shifted in elite discourse about colonialism. Although moral language associated with the "civilizing mission" dominates early discourse, the same narratives regain prominence after the Second World War and persist in present day discussions. Economic and military narratives appear more sensitive to relatively well-defined periods of crisis and their salience generally declines after decolonization. The study speaks to ongoing controversies over colonial memory and the role of normative rhetoric in legislatures.
Democratic Backsliding on the Legislative Floor: Evidence from Zambia (with Donghyun Danny Choi)
How does democratic backsliding affect the behavior of incumbent party and opposition legislators in parliament? We investigate this question in the context of Zambia, which experienced a significant spate of oppression against the opposition party during the Presidency of Edgar Lungu. Using computational text analysis on a corpus of 1,292 parliamentary sessions from 2001—2021, we systematically analyze how legislative debates between incumbent and opposition players evolved during a period of democratic turmoil compared to periods of relative democratic stability. We specifically examine changes in the composition of legislators who speak up during these debates, the topics raised, as well as the extent of incivility across party lines. Our findings reveal how democratic backsliding manifests in the legislative arena, which has implications for freedom of speech and democratic discourse.
Agents of Judicial Repression: Prosecutors and Judges in Autocratic Courts (with Jane Esberg)
Dictators often use courts to legitimize repression, but doing so requires delegating authority to prosecutors and judges. While prior scholarship assumes that the courts are subservient to dictators, this paper examines how the career incentives of prosecutors and judges can lead to disagreement in the adjudication of political crimes. We argue that this disagreement is central to the legitimizing function of judicial repression. Using an original dataset on over 9,000 political trials during the Francisco Franco dictatorship in Spain (1964--1976), including fine-grained details on both pre- and post-trial outcomes, we find significant disagreement between what prosecutors demand and judges deliver in the adjudication of crimes against the state, resulting in relatively large acquittal rates. However, disagreement was not inherently problematic for the autocratic regime because it arguably helped legitimize repression by showing that the outcomes of political prosecutions were not always rigged. Our results suggest that judicial repression in autocratic regimes may not be straightforward process of delegation and execution; to the contrary, by examining interactions between prosecutorial and judicial agents, as well as a range of trial, pre-trial, and post-trial outcomes, we gain better understanding of how autocratic courts function, as well as the dynamics of principal-agent problems in dictatorship.
Combating Corruption in African Countries: Foreign Creditors and Domestic Institutions (with Leonardo Arriola)
Idioms of Empire: Political Narratives of Colonialism in the French Parliament, 1881-2005 (with Risa Kitagawa)
While a growing scholarship examines the legacies of colonialism, few studies address how members of colonial powers themselves discussed and debated the issues of empire. We examine how elites have framed colonial issues in political discourse over time, both during and after the formal colonial period. Focusing on France, we leverage a word embeddings approach on an original French-language corpus of parliamentary debates since 1881 and describe the degree to which moral, economic, and martial narratives have shifted in elite discourse about colonialism. Although moral language associated with the "civilizing mission" dominates early discourse, the same narratives regain prominence after the Second World War and persist in present day discussions. Economic and military narratives appear more sensitive to relatively well-defined periods of crisis and their salience generally declines after decolonization. The study speaks to ongoing controversies over colonial memory and the role of normative rhetoric in legislatures.
Democratic Backsliding on the Legislative Floor: Evidence from Zambia (with Donghyun Danny Choi)
How does democratic backsliding affect the behavior of incumbent party and opposition legislators in parliament? We investigate this question in the context of Zambia, which experienced a significant spate of oppression against the opposition party during the Presidency of Edgar Lungu. Using computational text analysis on a corpus of 1,292 parliamentary sessions from 2001—2021, we systematically analyze how legislative debates between incumbent and opposition players evolved during a period of democratic turmoil compared to periods of relative democratic stability. We specifically examine changes in the composition of legislators who speak up during these debates, the topics raised, as well as the extent of incivility across party lines. Our findings reveal how democratic backsliding manifests in the legislative arena, which has implications for freedom of speech and democratic discourse.
Agents of Judicial Repression: Prosecutors and Judges in Autocratic Courts (with Jane Esberg)
Dictators often use courts to legitimize repression, but doing so requires delegating authority to prosecutors and judges. While prior scholarship assumes that the courts are subservient to dictators, this paper examines how the career incentives of prosecutors and judges can lead to disagreement in the adjudication of political crimes. We argue that this disagreement is central to the legitimizing function of judicial repression. Using an original dataset on over 9,000 political trials during the Francisco Franco dictatorship in Spain (1964--1976), including fine-grained details on both pre- and post-trial outcomes, we find significant disagreement between what prosecutors demand and judges deliver in the adjudication of crimes against the state, resulting in relatively large acquittal rates. However, disagreement was not inherently problematic for the autocratic regime because it arguably helped legitimize repression by showing that the outcomes of political prosecutions were not always rigged. Our results suggest that judicial repression in autocratic regimes may not be straightforward process of delegation and execution; to the contrary, by examining interactions between prosecutorial and judicial agents, as well as a range of trial, pre-trial, and post-trial outcomes, we gain better understanding of how autocratic courts function, as well as the dynamics of principal-agent problems in dictatorship.
Combating Corruption in African Countries: Foreign Creditors and Domestic Institutions (with Leonardo Arriola)
- Featured in The Calculus of Corruption Reform in Autocratic Regimes. Democracy & Autocracy. Vol. 20(1), 43-48.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Shen-Bayh, F. (2022), Reimagining the judiciary: Women's representation on high courts worldwide. By Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C., Hoekstra, Valerie J., Kang, Alice J., and Kittilson, Miki Caul, New York: Oxford University Press. 2021. pp. 201. $67.43 (cloth). Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12748
Shen-Bayh, F. (2021). Regime threats and state solutions: Bureaucratic loyalty and embeddedness in Kenya, Hassan, Mai, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2020. 308 pp. $99.99 (cloth). Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12624
Arriola, L., Dow, D., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2017. "Regional Responses to Human Rights Violations." Featured in Amnesty International Report: Africa: Counting Gains, Filling Gaps: Strengthening African Union’s Response to Human Rights Violations Committed in Conflict Situations
Shen-Bayh, F. (2022), Reimagining the judiciary: Women's representation on high courts worldwide. By Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C., Hoekstra, Valerie J., Kang, Alice J., and Kittilson, Miki Caul, New York: Oxford University Press. 2021. pp. 201. $67.43 (cloth). Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12748
Shen-Bayh, F. (2021). Regime threats and state solutions: Bureaucratic loyalty and embeddedness in Kenya, Hassan, Mai, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2020. 308 pp. $99.99 (cloth). Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12624
Arriola, L., Dow, D., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2017. "Regional Responses to Human Rights Violations." Featured in Amnesty International Report: Africa: Counting Gains, Filling Gaps: Strengthening African Union’s Response to Human Rights Violations Committed in Conflict Situations