ARTICLES
Choi, D., Harris, J. A., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2022. "Ethnic Bias in Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Criminal Appeals in Kenya." 1-14. American Political Science Review.
Shen-Bayh, F. 2018. "Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival." World Politics, 70(3), 321-357.
Choi, D., Harris, J. A., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2022. "Ethnic Bias in Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Criminal Appeals in Kenya." 1-14. American Political Science Review.
- Fiona McGillivray Best Paper Award (2020), the Political Economy section of the American Political Science Association (APSA)
- Featured in Unpacking Judicial Bias in Africa. Democracy in Africa Blog
Shen-Bayh, F. 2018. "Strategies of Repression: Judicial and Extrajudicial Methods of Autocratic Survival." World Politics, 70(3), 321-357.
- Best Article Award (2019) from Democracy and Autocracy, an organized section of APSA
WORKING PAPERS
"The Language of Legitimacy: Framing the International Criminal Court in African News Media." (with Risa Kitagawa)
What role do elites play in framing international organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) as illegitimate, racist, and corrupt? We develop a two-stage argument to explain how elite discourse in regional forums such as the African Union (AU) can have ripple effects on broader discussions of international justice---in some cases, changing the literal terms of debate. First, elite agenda setters use persuasive argumentation in the public sphere to discuss the legitimacy of international institutions, debates which can generate a cross-cutting elite consensus. Second, the language of elite consensus can influence broader public discourse on the legitimacy of the ICC when it is disseminated and amplified by the popular press. To test this argument, we use an original corpus of Kenyan and Zimbabwean news articles and leverage natural language processing techniques to track how the ICC is discussed in local media. Our findings reveal that the content of ICC news coverage varies over time and in response to elite efforts to discredit the Court, which were subsequently reflected in more negative media portrayals of the Court as an illegitimate institution. This study underscores the complex, nuanced relationship between elite and popular narratives of international justice and suggest new mechanisms by which elite discourse is filtered down to domestic audiences.
“Combating Corruption in African Countries: Foreign Creditors and Domestic Institutions.” (with Leonardo Arriola)
Although many governments have adopted measures to investigate and prosecute malfeasance by public officials, there remains considerable cross-national variation in institutional responses to high-level corruption. Under what conditions have governments established anti-corruption agencies? What impact have such agencies had on the prevalence of corruption? In addressing such questions, we argue that the origin of anti-corruption agencies ultimately undermined their purpose in African countries. Because governments established agencies to address the concerns of foreign creditors, principally multilateral institutions and Western donors, these agencies have been largely detached from domestic constituencies that might have otherwise demanded results. Moreover, since anti-corruption agencies are tangential to the primary interests of multilateral institutions, they have had little incentive to consistently ensure that agencies fulfill their mandates in practice. We assess these claims by analyzing original cross-national time-series data. Our findings show that anti-corruption agencies were established more rapidly in countries with greater debt service obligations, regardless of domestic political or economic conditions. We further show that anti-corruption agencies have had a negative effect on corruption: perceived levels have grown faster in countries that established agencies early on to satisfy foreign creditors.
"Courting Whom? Perceptions of Political Justice in Autocratic Regimes."
Autocrats routinely weaponize courts for political ends. But the design of autocratic courts can vary between regular state forums and irregular parastatal tribunals. When and why do autocrats use different venues to pursue political justice? I argue that judicial forum-shopping can be used to curry favor with specific audiences because different courts invoke unique customs of adjudication, the proceedings of which may be more comprehensible to certain groups. With respect to political justice, directing cases to select venues can help legitimize court proceedings before select audiences, particularly those whose support the autocrat wishes to cultivate. I evaluate these claims in postcolonial Malawi where the one-party regime created parastatal courts to operate in parallel with the regular state system. I find that the design and operation of parastatal courts reflected the autocrat's desire to rally the support of specific audiences; choices which had significant consequences for the delivery of political justice in the decades that followed.
"The Language of Legitimacy: Framing the International Criminal Court in African News Media." (with Risa Kitagawa)
What role do elites play in framing international organizations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) as illegitimate, racist, and corrupt? We develop a two-stage argument to explain how elite discourse in regional forums such as the African Union (AU) can have ripple effects on broader discussions of international justice---in some cases, changing the literal terms of debate. First, elite agenda setters use persuasive argumentation in the public sphere to discuss the legitimacy of international institutions, debates which can generate a cross-cutting elite consensus. Second, the language of elite consensus can influence broader public discourse on the legitimacy of the ICC when it is disseminated and amplified by the popular press. To test this argument, we use an original corpus of Kenyan and Zimbabwean news articles and leverage natural language processing techniques to track how the ICC is discussed in local media. Our findings reveal that the content of ICC news coverage varies over time and in response to elite efforts to discredit the Court, which were subsequently reflected in more negative media portrayals of the Court as an illegitimate institution. This study underscores the complex, nuanced relationship between elite and popular narratives of international justice and suggest new mechanisms by which elite discourse is filtered down to domestic audiences.
“Combating Corruption in African Countries: Foreign Creditors and Domestic Institutions.” (with Leonardo Arriola)
- Featured in The Calculus of Corruption Reform in Autocratic Regimes. Democracy & Autocracy. Vol. 20(1), 43-48.
Although many governments have adopted measures to investigate and prosecute malfeasance by public officials, there remains considerable cross-national variation in institutional responses to high-level corruption. Under what conditions have governments established anti-corruption agencies? What impact have such agencies had on the prevalence of corruption? In addressing such questions, we argue that the origin of anti-corruption agencies ultimately undermined their purpose in African countries. Because governments established agencies to address the concerns of foreign creditors, principally multilateral institutions and Western donors, these agencies have been largely detached from domestic constituencies that might have otherwise demanded results. Moreover, since anti-corruption agencies are tangential to the primary interests of multilateral institutions, they have had little incentive to consistently ensure that agencies fulfill their mandates in practice. We assess these claims by analyzing original cross-national time-series data. Our findings show that anti-corruption agencies were established more rapidly in countries with greater debt service obligations, regardless of domestic political or economic conditions. We further show that anti-corruption agencies have had a negative effect on corruption: perceived levels have grown faster in countries that established agencies early on to satisfy foreign creditors.
"Courting Whom? Perceptions of Political Justice in Autocratic Regimes."
Autocrats routinely weaponize courts for political ends. But the design of autocratic courts can vary between regular state forums and irregular parastatal tribunals. When and why do autocrats use different venues to pursue political justice? I argue that judicial forum-shopping can be used to curry favor with specific audiences because different courts invoke unique customs of adjudication, the proceedings of which may be more comprehensible to certain groups. With respect to political justice, directing cases to select venues can help legitimize court proceedings before select audiences, particularly those whose support the autocrat wishes to cultivate. I evaluate these claims in postcolonial Malawi where the one-party regime created parastatal courts to operate in parallel with the regular state system. I find that the design and operation of parastatal courts reflected the autocrat's desire to rally the support of specific audiences; choices which had significant consequences for the delivery of political justice in the decades that followed.
BOOK CHAPTERS & REVIEWS
Shen-Bayh, F. (2021). Regime threats and state solutions: Bureaucratic loyalty and embeddedness in Kenya, Hassan, Mai, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2020. 308 pp. $99.99 (cloth). Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12624
Gloppen, S., Wang, V., Kanyongolo, E. and Shen-Bayh, F. “Malawi: Democratic Fits and Starts” In Democratic Backsliding in Africa? Autocratization, Resilience, and Contention, eds. L. Arriola, L. Rakner, and N. van de Walle
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Arriola, L., Dow, D., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2017. "Regional Responses to Human Rights Violations."
Featured in Amnesty International Report: Africa: Counting Gains, Filling Gaps: Strengthening African Union’s Response to Human Rights Violations Committed in Conflict Situations
Shen-Bayh, F. (2021). Regime threats and state solutions: Bureaucratic loyalty and embeddedness in Kenya, Hassan, Mai, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2020. 308 pp. $99.99 (cloth). Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12624
Gloppen, S., Wang, V., Kanyongolo, E. and Shen-Bayh, F. “Malawi: Democratic Fits and Starts” In Democratic Backsliding in Africa? Autocratization, Resilience, and Contention, eds. L. Arriola, L. Rakner, and N. van de Walle
- Forthcoming in Oxford University Press, 2022
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Arriola, L., Dow, D., and Shen-Bayh, F. 2017. "Regional Responses to Human Rights Violations."
Featured in Amnesty International Report: Africa: Counting Gains, Filling Gaps: Strengthening African Union’s Response to Human Rights Violations Committed in Conflict Situations
SELECTED WORKS IN PROGRESS
"The Politics of Colonial Responsibility: Evidence from British and French Parliamentary Debates." (with Risa Kitagawa)
What does the ex-colonizer owe to the ex-colonized? Whether former colonial powers should apologize to their former colonies has become a recent source of debate. Some European governments have begun offering gestures of remorse falling short of reparations, whereas others appear to be more nostalgic for empire and largely unwilling to repent. To fully appreciate popular discourse on the legacies of imperialism and white supremacy in the contemporary era, in this study, we examine the history of political debates on the colonial project. We specifically compare how colonialism has been depicted by France and Britain over the past 150 years of parliamentary proceedings. Using computational text analysis techniques, we parse an original corpus of substantially verbatim reports from the floors of the French and British parliaments. Dissecting debates from 19th century to present day helps us to uncover how the framing of colonialism has evolved over time and across contexts. By taking the long-run historical view, we seek to understand how the terms of debate on colonial rule have evolved both before and after decolonization, as well as how such language has influenced contemporary debates on apology and accountability.
"Democratic Backsliding on the Legislative Floor: Evidence from Zambia." (with Danny Choi)
How does democratic backsliding affect the behavior of incumbent party and opposition legislators in parliament? We investigate this question in the context of Zambia, which experienced a significant spate of oppression against the opposition party during the Presidency of Edgar Lungu. Using computational text analysis on a corpus of 1,292 parliamentary sessions from 2001—2021, we systematically analyze how legislative debates between incumbent and opposition players evolved during a period of democratic turmoil compared to periods of relative democratic stability. We specifically examine changes in the composition of legislators who speak up during these debates, the topics raised, as well as the extent of incivility across party lines. Our findings reveal how democratic backsliding manifests in the legislative arena, which has implications for freedom of speech and democratic discourse.
"The Politics of Colonial Responsibility: Evidence from British and French Parliamentary Debates." (with Risa Kitagawa)
What does the ex-colonizer owe to the ex-colonized? Whether former colonial powers should apologize to their former colonies has become a recent source of debate. Some European governments have begun offering gestures of remorse falling short of reparations, whereas others appear to be more nostalgic for empire and largely unwilling to repent. To fully appreciate popular discourse on the legacies of imperialism and white supremacy in the contemporary era, in this study, we examine the history of political debates on the colonial project. We specifically compare how colonialism has been depicted by France and Britain over the past 150 years of parliamentary proceedings. Using computational text analysis techniques, we parse an original corpus of substantially verbatim reports from the floors of the French and British parliaments. Dissecting debates from 19th century to present day helps us to uncover how the framing of colonialism has evolved over time and across contexts. By taking the long-run historical view, we seek to understand how the terms of debate on colonial rule have evolved both before and after decolonization, as well as how such language has influenced contemporary debates on apology and accountability.
"Democratic Backsliding on the Legislative Floor: Evidence from Zambia." (with Danny Choi)
How does democratic backsliding affect the behavior of incumbent party and opposition legislators in parliament? We investigate this question in the context of Zambia, which experienced a significant spate of oppression against the opposition party during the Presidency of Edgar Lungu. Using computational text analysis on a corpus of 1,292 parliamentary sessions from 2001—2021, we systematically analyze how legislative debates between incumbent and opposition players evolved during a period of democratic turmoil compared to periods of relative democratic stability. We specifically examine changes in the composition of legislators who speak up during these debates, the topics raised, as well as the extent of incivility across party lines. Our findings reveal how democratic backsliding manifests in the legislative arena, which has implications for freedom of speech and democratic discourse.